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Abstract: 
Using monthly GDP forecasts from Consensus Economics Inc. for 18 developed 
countries reported over 24 different forecast horizons during 1989-2004, we find that the 
survey forecasts do not have much value when the horizon goes beyond 18 months. 
Using two alternative approaches to measure the flow of new information in fixed-target 
survey forecasts, we found that the biggest improvement in forecasting performance 
comes when the forecast horizon is around 14 months. The dynamics of information 
accumulation over forecast horizons can provide both the forecasters and their clients 
with an important clue in their selection of the timing and frequency in the use of 
forecasting services. The limits to forecasting that these private market forecasters exhibit 













  21. Introduction 
  How far ahead into the future do macroeconomic forecasts have value and how 
does the information content of forecasts change over forecast horizon is a question that 
has been the focus of various studies.
1 Most of these studies, however, provide measures 
for the information content of optimal forecasts over forecast horizons by modeling the 
actual data generating process. For example, Öller (1985) and Galbraith (2003) provide 
estimates of the length of the forecast horizon at which the optimal forecasts contain 
information by assuming that the actual process follows an ARIMA process. Similarly, 
Oke and Öller (1999) provide estimates by modeling the actual process using VARMA 
process. 
Granger (1996) pointed out that a feature that will provide limits to how far ahead 
one can forecast is when the (forecastable) signal gets lost in the (unforecastable) noise. 
In other words, forecasts will not provide any information when the measurement errors 
start to make the information content of signals negligible compared to noise. In reality, 
the measurement errors are not only driven by the level of noise attributed to the data 
generating process but also to other factors. For example, delays in data releases and data 
revisions, not to mention structural breaks that are only detectable ex post, are some of 
the factors that may affect the information content of real-time forecasts. In these 
situations, a forecaster will seem to respond to information that is relevant but also to 
what is not. These factors do not cause problems in ex post analysis of historical data but 
may induce serious deformation in the information content of real-time forecasts. 
                                                 
1 See for example, Parzen (1982), Öller (1985), De Gooijer and Klein (1992), Diebold and Kilian (1997), 
Oke and Öller (1999), and Galbraith (2003). 
  3  Only a handful of studies have used real-time survey data to estimate the 
information content of forecasts (e.g., Mills and Pepper, 1999; Vuchelen and Gutierrez, 
2005), and no one has examined the dynamics of how the information content of 
forecasts change over horizons and how new information increases the information value 
of forecasts. However, understanding the changes in the information content of forecasts 
over horizons and, for example, the timing of the arrival of the most important 
information is critical for both the forecasters and their clients. It is well known that many 
forecasting agencies like the OECD, Blue Chip, etc. produce forecasts several times a 
year from an initial 24-month ahead forecast. Some knowledge on the dynamics of 
information accumulation over forecast horizons can provide forecasters with an 
important parameter in their selection of the timing and the frequency in the use of 
forecasting service. For the clients of forecasting firms, the information content of 
forecasts can be an important consideration in their decisions on how to use and when to 
use these forecasts.  
  In this study we address these issues using 15 years of monthly private sector 
forecast data for 18 developed countries reported over 24 different forecast horizons. We 
study various characteristics of real GDP growth forecasts over forecast horizons and 
their differences across countries, and propose two measures for the content of new 
information in forecasts. We find that the flow of new information to year-over-year GDP 
growth forecasts follows a hump-shaped curve over horizons with a peak point when the 
forecast horizon is around 14 months.  
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data. 
Section 3 discusses certain stylized facts on the evolution of forecasts in a cross–country 
  4setting, and reports estimates on the flow of new information at various horizons using 
two alternative approaches. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data 
  In this study three data sets are used. The main data of the study on real GDP 
forecasts come from the Consensus Economics, Inc. The second and third data sets 
contain the actual data series but with different vintages. Our historical data for real GDP 
growth rates (to calculate the 5-year GDP growth averages and to model the actual GDP 
growth but not to evaluate forecasts) is constructed from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (February 2002 edition). Our real time data set for the purpose of 
forecast evaluation is mainly constructed from the OECD’s mid-year Economic Outlook, 
1990 to 2004, DEA’s Survey of Business and Bundesbank’s Monthly Economic Reports. 
The details of the data sets follow. 
  Since October 1989, the Consensus Economics Inc. has been polling more than 
600 forecasters each month and recording their forecasts for principal macroeconomic 
variables (including GDP growth, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates) for a large 
number of countries. Forecasts are made for the current year (based on partial 
information about developments in that year) and for the following year. The number of 
panelists ranges from 10 to 30 for most of the countries, and for the major industrialized 
countries the panelists are based in countries they forecast.  
We study the consensus forecasts of annual average real GDP growth. Survey 
respondents make their first forecasts when there are 24 months to the end of the year 
they are forecasting; that is, they start forecasting GDP growth in January of the previous 
year, and their last forecast is reported in the beginning of December of the target year. 
  5So for each country and for each target year we have 24 forecasts of varying horizons. 
Our data set ranges from October 1989 to June 2004. The countries we study are the 
eighteen industrialized countries for which forecasts are available from Consensus 
Economics, Inc.
 2 
There have been several major changes in the definition of forecast variable since 
the survey started in 1989. For example, while real GNP was being forecast in the first 
few years for some countries, the real GDP became the forecast variable since early 
1990s. For example, this switch occurred in January 1992 for the US and in January 1993 
for Germany. In our data sample, the most significant changes were for Germany. While 
West Germany’s real GNP growth was being forecast through December 1992, after 
January 1993 the forecast variable became real GDP of West Germany. In addition, 
unified Germany’s GDP growth was added to the survey and West Germany’s GDP 
forecast was removed in May 1997. 
        In order to evaluate the forecast errors correctly, the forecasts should be matched 
with the actual data being forecast. It is well documented in the literature that data 
revisions may have an important impact on the perceived performance of the forecasters. 
Since forecasters cannot possibly be aware of data revisions after they report their 
forecasts, we use an early revision as the actual value, which is compiled from the mid-
year reports of OECD Economic Outlook immediately following the target year. But 
because of the changes in definitions of target variables (e.g., GNP to GDP or West 
Germany to Unified Germany) some of the data are not available in the June issues of 
                                                 
2 There are only a very few of studies that have used the Consensus Forecasts data set. These are Artis and 
Zhang (1997), Batchelor (2001), Harvey, Leybourne and Newbold (2001), Loungani (2001), Juhn and 
Loungani (2002), Gallo, Granger and Jeon (2002), and Isiklar, Lahiri and Loungani (2006). However, none 
of these studies consider the empirical findings analyzed in this paper.  
  6OECD Economic Outlook. We collected these missing data from the original sources, 
viz., May and June issues of BEA's Survey of Business and Bundesbank's Monthly 
Economic Reports for the year immediately following the target year. 
3.  Evolution of Fixed-Target Forecasts over Horizons 
  Figure 1 presents the reported forecasts and the realized actual values between 
1991 and 2002. Each country's forecasts are divided into three separate panels, which are 
located horizontally in the figures. Plots start when the forecast horizon is 24, which is 
reported in January of the previous year, and end when the forecast horizon is 0, which 
gives the actual realization. Gallo et al. (2002) presented this type of graphs for 1993-96 
and for three major countries: U.S., U.K., and Japan. We can now examine certain 
stylized characteristics of the forecast evolution in greater depth.  
  First, note that for the first six months or so (i.e., for horizons 24 to 18 months), 
the consensus forecasts do not seem to change very much. This empirical observation 
leads us to believe that over these horizons, forecasters do not receive dependable 
information to revise their forecasts systematically. There are important exceptions, 
however. For the target year 1994, forecasts for Belgium, France, Ireland, and Spain were 
active from the beginning.  
  Second, except for Ireland and Japan, the initial forecasts for all other countries 
seem to be starting from a relatively narrow band and then tend to diverge from these 
initial starting points. For example, for Austria, Belgium, Denmark and several other 
countries 24-month ahead forecasts are located between 2 percent and 3 percent, and as 
information is accumulated these forecasts tend to move towards their final destination. 
  One may conjecture that these initial long-term forecasts are nothing but 
  7unconditional means of the processes. While this conjecture seems to hold for most of the 
forecasts, the initial forecasts of Irish and Japanese GDP growth rates seem to behave 
differently. For Ireland, the forecasts tend to move upward and for Japan the forecasts 
tend to move downward as we go from the far left panel (forecasts for 1991 to 1994) to 
the far right panel (forecasts for 1999 to 2002). This is understandable given Japan’s 
stagnation and Ireland’s extraordinary growth during the 90s.  This movement of the 24-
month ahead forecasts implies that the long-term expectations have been changing for 
these two countries, and that recent short run forecast errors have affected the longer-run 
expectations. See Frenkel (1975) who hypothesized such a feedback.
3  
 Third,  Gallo  et al. (2002) noted that the consensus forecasts sometimes do not 
converge to the right target value due to possible copycat behavior by non-dominant 
forecasters.  In our more comprehensive data set, even though we see some indication of 
such behavior in certain years for some countries, evidence is not pervasive. For Ireland 
the one-month ahead forecasts underestimated the targets repeatedly, but this can be 
explained by the exceptional Irish growth during the nineties. As documented by them, 
and we also find in Figure 1, U.S. growth for 1995 was seriously overestimated even a 
month before the end of the target. The last US consensus forecast for 1995 was 3.24% 
whereas the actual growth based on July revision was 2.03%. This again can be explained 
by the fact that in the U.S., 1995 was a sudden unanticipated growth slowdown year.
4   
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, the 24-ahead forecasts should be considered as medium-term rather than long-term 
forecasts.  
4 Öller and Barot (2000) have argued that the divergence between the final forecasts and the preliminary 
announcements can also be due to the fact that the former tends to underestimate the final figures during 
upturns and overestimate during downturns. In estimating the preliminary figures, statistical agencies use 
sample of firms from the previous year sample in which freshly established companies could be missing 
and conversely, bankrupted companies would be included and impute group averages. In support of the 
above conjecture, we note that even though the US growth based on preliminary data was 2.03%, it was 
later revised upwards to 2.50%.  
  8  All in all, a close look at these graphs reveals certain undeniable regularities on 
how the fixed-target forecasts evolve over time.  We now proceed to examine more 
rigorously the timing of the arrival of important information when forecasters break away 
from their initial estimates. 
4.  Forecast variance and forecast horizons 
  Forecasts presented in Figure 1 clearly show that the initial 24-month ahead 
forecasts are reasonably stable over years, and as the forecast horizon decreases, they 
tend to diverge. In other words, forecast variability increases as the forecast horizon 
decreases. While variability of forecast errors is usually associated with uncertainty, 
forecast variability is inversely related to uncertainty. This argument may look counter 
intuitive but can be easily understood by the following logic. Consider  
,, tt h t yf h ε =+ 
where yt is the actual GDP growth,  , th f  is the h-period ahead forecast and  , th ε  denote the 
ex ante error associated with this forecast. Since rational expectations imply that 
,, (,) th th Cov f 0 ε =  we have Var , ( ) ( ) tt h Var f Var , t h () y ε = +
)
, which implies that the 
variations in forecasts and forecast errors move in opposite directions as the forecast 
horizon changes (note Var  does not depend on the forecast horizon). ( t y
5 Therefore as 
the forecast horizon increases the forecast error variability, and therefore the uncertainty, 
increases, but the forecast variability decreases. 
  This observation is confirmed more clearly in Figure 2, where we present the 
sample variances of the forecasts, i.e.,∑ −
t
t h h t N f f / ) (
2
, , over our sample period at each 
                                                 
5 This point is noted by several studies. See, for example, Muth (1985). 
  9forecast horizon. The last points in the charts, the points when the horizon is zero, give 
the variances of the actual values over the sample. As is seen from these figures, as the 
forecast horizon decreases the variance of the forecast steadily increases. Another way of 
looking at this increasing variability of forecasts is that as forecast horizon increases 
more information is accumulated and as more information is accumulated in the forecasts 
the variation of forecasts increases. This information accumulation process can be 
mimicked using a simple MA model for the data generating process. Suppose that the 
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,1 , 1 () ( ) th th h Var f Var f θ σ −− =+ . 
  So when the forecast horizon is very long, i.e. several years, the forecasts tend to 
converge towards the mean of the process, and as information is accumulated, the 
forecasts change increasing the forecast variability. It is interesting to note that Mankiw 
  10and Shapiro (1986) used the same argument to conclude that U.S. GDP revisions are 
“news” rather than “noise”. If successive revisions incorporate useful information about 
past GDP growth, then we will expect the successive revised figures to have more 
variance than the initial announcement. 
  While the positive slope in the forecast variance graphs is clear in all figures, 
there are some differences across countries that are worth mentioning. First, for some 
countries, e.g., Japan and the USA, the positive slope is not very distinct in the longer-run 
forecasts, especially when the horizon is more than 18 months. As just shown, the 
forecast variability increases because of the variability of the accumulated shocks, i.e. 
kt k θ ε −
|| k
s. Therefore, if forecast variability does not change much over several horizons as 
is the case, e.g., for Japanese forecasts for horizons from 24 to 15, this may mean that the 
information acquired 15 months ago does not have much impact on the actual value, i.e. 
θ  is small. Of course, this may also be related to the informational inefficiency of the 
forecasts. It is possible that even if the information over this period were important, the 
forecasters do not incorporate the information in their forecasts causing less than optimal 
variability in the forecasts. This issue will be addressed later on when we present forecast 
evaluation measures that are based on forecast errors over forecast horizons. 
  It is interesting to note that for some countries, the variation of actual values is 
much larger than the variation of one-month ahead forecasts. This is particularly true for 
Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and Switzerland.
6 There can be several reasons for 
this. One-period ahead forecasts can be written as:  
,1 ,1 tt t yfu =+ 
                                                 
6 Finland has one of the largest GDP growth variances among industrialized countries, see Öller and Barot 
(2000).  
  11where u  is the error associated with one-step ahead forecasts. Suppose that forecasts are 
efficiently constructed so that 
,1 t
,, (|) th th th Ey I f , =  which implies that  ,1 ,1 (,)0 tt Cov f u = . 
Then, if the variation of the actual values is very large compared to the forecasts then this 
implies that the variance of u  is very large, which means that there is significant 
information revealed in the last month of the year.
,1 t
y
7 But if the forecasts are not efficient 
and if   then we have Var ,1 ,1 (,) tt Cov f u ≠ 0 t ,1 , () ( ) ( ) tt Var f Var u 1 ,1 ,1 )2 ( , t t Cov f u = ++
,1) t u
 
which implies that the large difference between the variation of actual and the forecasts 
can be due to both the variation in noise and the inefficiency Cov . So the large 
difference between the variances may occur even if the actual process is not very noisy. 
,1 (, t f
Finally, it is worth noting the implications of rational expectations and implicit 
expectations in the graphs. As it is well known, Muth's (1961) rational expectations 
hypothesis requires that forecasts should be uncorrelated with the forecast errors, which 
also implies that the variance of the actual process should be larger than the variance of 
the forecasts, i.e. Var . On the other hand, implicit expectations, pioneered 
by Mills (1957), state that the actual realizations should be uncorrelated with the forecast 
errors, and the variance of actual realizations should be lower than the variance of 
forecasts,  i.e.  .
, () ( ) t y Var f >
, () ( ) tt Var y Var f <
t h
h
                                                
8 The evidence in Figure 2 clearly supports the 
implications of rational expectations since variances of actual realizations are larger than 
 
7 Large data revisions between December and June may also be responsible for high variation inu .  ,1 t
8Using this difference between the rational and implicit expectations, Muth (1985) claimed that firm 
production forecasts are not consistent with rational expectations hypothesis and proposed a hybrid model 
of expectation formation in which rational and implicit expectations are special cases. Also see Lovell 
(1986) for a comparison of the rational expectation and the implicit expectations hypotheses. Lahiri and 
Lee (1979) justify additional variance in forecasts in terms of possible errors in measurement in the survey 
data in a rational expectations model.  
  12those of forecasts in majority of the cases. However, short-run forecasts of some 
countries, namely France, Germany, Denmark, Japan, and the UK seem to mildly violate 
this relation possibly due to measurement errors. 
5.  Information content of forecasts 
  Information value of a forecast is related to how accurate the forecasts are. In this 
section, we will provide statistics such as mean square error (MSE), mean absolute error 
(MAE) and Theil’s U statistic along with another statistic recently proposed by Diebold 
and Kilian (2001). While MSE and MAE depend on the variability of the actual process, 
Theil’s U statistic scales the RMSE by the variability of underlying data and has the 
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=− − ∑∑ ,        ( 4 )  
which compares the forecast errors with a naive forecast . If U n y h is larger than one, the 
forecast does not beat the naive forecast. An important issue in calculating the Uh is the 
selection of the naive forecast. While many studies have used the no-change forecast as 
the naive forecast, in this study, we will use the 5-year rolling GDP growth averages two 
years before the end of the target year as the benchmark forecast. We also tried forecasts 
of no change as . One problem in using the lagged actual value as the benchmark in our 
case is that when the forecast horizon is more than 12 months, the forecasters do not 
know y
n y
t-1. So the benchmark yt-1 may be considered unduly stringent. On the other hand, 
the benchmark yt-2 can be considered too lenient because the current year forecasts will 
have yt-1 known. Also, due to data revisions the lagged value may have to be changed 
depending on one’s assumption on the forecasters’ knowledge and beliefs about the latest 
  13GDP. Given that the actual GDP growth is stationary and known, rolling averages can be 
considered to be a more suitable and transparent benchmark.
9  
A measure of predictability due to Diebold and Kilian (2001) is defined as
10 
() ()() ( (, ) 1 / s psk ELe ELe  =−  ) k   , where  ( ) ( ) k ELe  denotes the expected loss in the 
long-run forecasts and   denotes the expected loss in the short-run forecasts. If 
mean squared errors are used as the loss function, we have
() () s ELe
( , ) 1 / Sk p sk M S E M S E =− . 
Diebold and Kilian (2001) used this measure to compute the predictability of several 
macro variables using realized data and noted that it would be interesting to use this 
measure on the forecast survey data. Thus, when k-period ahead (e.g., 24 months) survey 
forecast is used as the naïve forecast,  (, ) p sk will give the improvement in forecasts as 
the horizon decreases. To the best of our knowledge, no study has ever used this statistic 
on survey data. 
Table 1 presents MAE, MSE, and U statistics for 12-month and 24-month ahead 
forecasts. As expected, MAE and MSE are uniformly less for 12-month forecasts 
compared to the 24-month forecasts for all countries. For 24-month ahead forecasts, U is 
less than one for all countries except for Italy and Switzerland, but very marginally. For 
12-month ahead forecasts, all the countries have U statistics less than one, suggesting that 
the forecasts have predictive value over the naïve forecast.
11 
                                                 
9 We thank the two anonymous referees for making this suggestion. 
10 This measure is also related to the forecast content function proposed by Galbraith (2003). In Galbraith's 
forecast content function, MSE of the unconditional mean forecast replaces MSEk, which also defines the 
so-called skill score that has been used extensively in other disciplines (see, for instance, Murphy (1988)). 
11 Following Artis and Marcellino (2001) and Diebold and Mariano (1995), we also tested the statistical 
significance of the MSE and MAE figures against our benchmark. At the 5% significance level, the 24-
month forecasts were insignificant for all countries except one, and the 12-months forecasts were 
significant only for seven countries. Due to the relatively small sample size, these tests might not have 
adequate power to reject the null of equal forecast accuracy.   
  14  Figure 3 presents Theil’s  () h y U  and Diebold and Kilian’s for each 
forecast horizon and country. Notice that large values of Theil’s U imply large forecast 
errors. On the other hand, large values of imply that forecasts improve 
considerably over the 24-month ahead forecast
( ,24) ph
( ,24) ph
,24 t f . The left axes in the figures show 
() h Uy  whereas the right axes show the values of . To pinpoint the longest 
horizon at which the forecasts beat the naive forecast, Figure 3 includes a vertical line 
through the longest horizon at which the estimated 
( ph ,24)
() h y U  is lower than one. This 
provides an easy way to compare the countries with each other. For all countries, as 
expected, the quality of the forecasts increases as the forecast horizon decreases. The 
graphs also point out certain amount of heterogeneity across countries. 
  When we look at the performance rankings based on  () h y U , we again observe 
that other than Italy and Switzerland, all the country forecasts beat the naïve forecast 
when the forecast horizon is 24. We also observe that, as expected, for all countries the 
() h Uy  decreases gradually as forecast horizon decreases. Even the Switzerland and 
Italian forecasts beat the naïve forecasts when forecast horizons are 19 and 17 months, 
respectively.
12  
 The Diebold-Kilian measure of predictability   shows the improvement 
in the information content of the forecasts as measured by the decrease in MSE over that 
of the 24-month ahead forecasts. As shown in Figure 3, the predictive ability of GDP 
( ,24) ph
                                                 
12 For the sake of comparison, we also looked at forecast efficiency with no-change as the naïve forecast. 
The MSE and MAE associated with 5-year rolling average of actual values as forecasts were higher than 
those with yt-1 for all countries, and significantly so for most. Thus, the information requirement of yt-1 as 
the benchmark is very stringent. As expected, we observe that it is much harder to beat the one-year lagged 
GDP growth as the naïve forecast. Now, for the 24-month-ahead forecasts, U statistic is less than one for 
only Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the U.S.; the worst performers are Portugal, Ireland, and 
Netherlands. For 12-month-ahead forecasts, all countries, with the exception of Ireland and Portugal, have 
U statistics less than one, implying that the forecasts have value over the no-change forecast.   
  15forecasts for some countries (e.g., Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan and USA) 
does not improve over the 24-month ahead forecasts when the horizon remains relatively 
long, but for some other countries (e.g., Germany, Ireland, Spain), each additional month 
increases the information content of the forecasts over the previous month even in longer-
run forecasts. For most of the countries, we see that MSE substantially decreases in the 
short-run forecasts causing  to be close to 100% when the forecast horizon is one 
month. Two exceptions are Norwegian and Irish GDP growth forecasts, where the final 
values of   are less than 80%, and can possibly be explained by relatively inferior 
preliminary GDP data.  
( ,24) ph
( ,24) ph
6.  Timing of the most valuable information 
  The slopes of the plots in Figure 3, which can be interpreted as a measure of the 
improvement in forecast quality over horizons, is found to be somewhat different from 
country to country. For example, the Norwegian curve does not have a steep slope, which 
implies that Norwegian forecasts do not improve rapidly with decreasing horizon, but the 
Japanese curve has a very steep slope implying that the forecast quality increases sharply 
as new information is acquired. 
  This last point brings us to another important query: Around what horizon is the 
most valuable information received or, in other words, at what horizon do the forecasts 
improve the most? The answers to these questions are related to the slopes of   
and  U
( ,24) ph
h curves and are addressed in the next sections, where we provide alternative 
approaches to measure the content of new information at a particular horizon. 
The first measure is based on forecast errors. The second measure is based only 
on the forecast revisions and can be seen as the content of new information as perceived 
  16by the forecasters. Following the literature cited above, another measure of forecast 
improvement will be constructed from the “optimum forecasts” using the time series 
representation of the actual quarterly GDP growth. We do this for the purpose of 
comparing forecast behavior with reality.   
6.1.  New information based on forecast errors 
  The first difference in the MSEh will provide an estimate for the new information 
content in forecasts when the horizon is h. From equation (2) an optimal forecast  , th f  
satisfies 
  () ( ) ( )
22
,, 1 , th th th h M S Ef M S Ef M S Ef θ σ + −= ∆≡ ,                             (5) 
which is equivalent to the information content of the new information in the actual 
process. Now suppose that  , th f %  is not an optimal forecast and is generated according to  
() ,, |
q
th t th k tk
kh
fE y I , µ θε
=
≡= + ∑ % % % % % ,                                           (6) 
where q denotes the largest forecast horizon at which the first forecast is reported. It 
defines the conditional mean of the actual process when the horizon is q,  i.e., 
,  ( | tt q Ey I µ − = % % ) , th ε %  denotes the 'news' component utilized by the forecaster, and  h θ % 
denotes the impact of this news component as perceived by the forecaster. 
For convenience, let us assume that the forecasters observe the news  , th ε  correctly 
but their utilization of news is not optimal, so that  hh θ θ ≠ %  and , th th , ε ε = % . From equation 







tt h kk t k k t
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yf , , k µ µθ θ εθ
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−= − + − + ∑∑ % % % ε ,       ( 7 )  
  17where the first component on the RHS denotes the bias in the forecast, the second 
component denotes the errors due to inefficiency, and the third component denotes the 
errors due to unforecastable events after the forecast is reported. Calculating MSE and 
assuming that sample estimates converge to their population values, we get 
()()







k µ µθ θ σ θ
−
==
=− + − + ∑∑ % % σ
h
.       ( 8 )  
Similarly calculating MSEh+1 and taking the first difference we find that 
1 hh MSE MSE MSE + ∆≡ − is 
()
2 22 2
hh h h MSE θ σθ θ σ ∆=− − % ,         ( 9 )  
which gives the improvement in the content of the forecasts with the new information. 
The first element on the RHS represents the maximum improvement in the quality of 
forecasts if the information is used efficiently, but the second component represents the 
mistakes in the utilization of the new information. If the usage of the most recent 
information  h θ % differs from its optimal value h θ , then the gain from the utilization of new 
information decreases. In the special case when hh θ θ = % , the equation (9) is equivalent to 
equation (5). In this case,  h MSE
2
h
∆  will be an estimate for the content of the new 
information in the actual process 
2 θ σ . 
6.2.  New information based on forecast revisions 
  While the use of  h MSE ∆  provides the improvement in forecasting performance at 
horizon h and therefore gives the information content of the news in terms of forecasting 
ability, a similar measure can be constructed based solely on forecasts without using the 
  18actual data on GDP growth. Notice that, based on equation (2), the optimal forecast 













, th h r θ =            ( 1 0 )  
In the sub-optimum case of equation (6), we have the forecast revision process 
, th h r θ = % .            ( 1 1 )  
Calculating the mean squared revisions (MSR) and taking the probability limit we get 
22
t h h MSR θ σ == % , 
2
which provides a measure for the reaction of the forecasters to news. But since 
forecasters react to the news based on their perception of the importance of the news, this 
measure can be seen as the content of the new information as perceived by the 
forecasters. Note the clear difference between  h MSE ∆  and MSRh. While the first one is 
driven by the forecast errors, the latter has nothing to do with the actual process. But both 
of the measures should give the same values if the survey forecasts are optimal. 
The difference between MSRh and  h MSE ∆  may provide important behavioral 
characteristics of the forecasters such as over or under reaction to the news at a specific 
forecast horizon. MSRh can be seen as a measure of how forecasters interpret the 
importance of news at a specific horizon, and  h MSE ∆  can be seen as the “prize” they get 
as a result of revising their forecasts. Suppose that forecasters make large revisions at 
horizon h
* but the performance of the forecasts do not improve much at that horizon, then 
one may conjecture that the forecasters react excessively to the news. To see this more 
clearly, simple algebra yields 
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22 2 hh h h h MSR MSE θ θθ σ −∆ = − %% , 
which is positive when 
2
hh h θ θθ > % %, which is the same as the condition || | h | h θ θ > % . But 
|| | hh | θ θ > %  is equivalent to overreaction to the news when the horizon is h. 
6.3. Empirical  comparisons 
  Before presenting the graphs for h MSE ∆ and MSRh, let us try to determine their 
plausible shapes conceptually. As shown earlier, we expect to see forecast variability to 
increase as new information is accumulated. If the information content in a particular 
period is much larger than in the previous period, we expect to see a marked increase in 
forecasting performance in that period. 
When the forecast horizon is very short, we expect the impact of new information 
on forecasts to be small for two reasons. First, the impact of a shock is determined partly 
by the length of time for the shock to be totally absorbed by the economy. For instance, 
one would expect the 9/11 terrorist attack to have affected the 2002 U.S. GDP growth 
more that the 2001 growth. When there is not enough time for the transmission 
mechanisms to impact output fully, the observed effect will be small. This implies that as 
horizon gets smaller the impact on GDP growth of a typical shock will be 
correspondingly smaller. Second, since the forecast variable is yearly real GDP growth, 
current year forecasts will be highly driven by the quarterly real GDP announcements and 
data revisions during the year. So as we approach the end of the target year, a lot of 
information about the target will already be known and it is expected that in the last few 
months the impact of the information will be very small. Consequently, we expect that 
the new information update will be small when the forecast horizon is short. Similar to 
  20the first reasoning above, when the horizon is long and the target is next year, the total 
impact is expected to be small since most of the impact will be consumed before the 
target year even starts. Also, forecasters may be reluctant to adjust forecasts to news 
immediately due to uncertainty. The uncertainty factor will tend to make the news arrival 
curve more concentrated towards the right. Nevertheless, these observations suggest that 
when the horizon is too short or too long forecast revisions due to new information is 
expected to be small, so that we expect the impact of shocks to peak in the middle 
horizons.  
  Figure 4 presents  h MSE ∆  (dots) and MSRh (boxes) values for our sample of 18 
countries. As a very rough approximation, we also present fitted quadratic polynomials to 
the data for each country. The fitted lines for  h MSE ∆  and MSRh are shown in bold and 
dashed lines, respectively. As it is clear from the figures, both these lines (with an 
exception of Finland) display the expected curvature over horizons. Even though our use 
of a simple quadratic functional form can be questioned, the relatively low information 
gains at the beginning and at the closing horizons are clearly discernable. For most of the 
countries the peak of the quadratic line is when forecast horizon is close to 12 months and 
usually when the horizon is between 14 months and 10 months. The exceptions to this 
statement (when  h MSE ∆  is considered) are Finnish and Irish forecasts. Both of these 
countries have experienced unusual movements in their real GDP growth rates in 1990s.  
  In majority of the cases,  h MSE ∆  and MSRh look similar. This implies that forecast 
revisions are mostly consistent with improvement in forecasting performance with 
decreasing horizons. Although forecast revision based MSRh does not use any actual 
value and does not depend on the traditional forecast error measure (as the  h MSE ∆  
  21graphs), peak points of the two measures still mostly match. But it may also be 
worthwhile to note that when the peak points do not coincide, MSRh peaks a few periods 
later than  h MSE ∆ . For most countries h MSE ∆ ’s are larger than MSRh’s at all horizons, 




                                                
Given the regularity across countries, and in order to estimate the information arrival 
curve without imposing any functional from, we pooled all the countries and estimated 
the  MSE ∆ and  MSRh curves non-parametrically,  see Hastie and Tibshirani (1986).
14 
These are reported in Figure 5 where we now clearly see that the peaks with both the 
curves come at about 14 months before the end of the target year. The shapes of the two 
curves when estimated non-parametrically are remarkably similar, even though MSRh 
exhibits a lot more adjustment towards the end of the forecasting period than h MSE ∆ . 
Thus, the ‘currency’ rather than the ‘time remaining’ for a unit perceived shock to affect 
the economy weighs more heavily in forecast revisions.  It seems that the imposition of a 
simple quadratic polynomial on individual countries with outliers might have shifted the 
peaks a little to the right for some countries. 
  The finding that for most of the countries, the biggest adjustment of forecasts to 
news happens when the horizon is close to 14 months on the average and, depending on 
the country, it can also vary any where between September of the previous year and 
 
13 Isiklar et al. (2006) estimate the extent of stickiness for G7 countries using the same data source, but a 
different methodology.  See Mankiw and Reis (2001) and Sims (2003) for alternative explanations.  
14 These functions were estimated based on the Spline Smoother with 3 degrees of freedom. The 
minimization problem was solved using Back-fitting and Local Scoring algorithms. Note that in addition to 
the Spline Smoother, we also used Kernel Smoother and Local Regression procedures. The results were 
practically the same. Allowing for fixed country effects also did not change the estimated functions. We 
used PROC GAM in SAS to do the calculations 
 
 
  22February of the current year (i.e., horizons 15 to 10 months) begs another interesting 
question: What is the source of information that is revealed during this time? Clearly 
official GDP announcements have to be one of the main information sources that will 
have a large impact on the forecasting performance. The initial GDP figures for the 
previous year, which is released as early as late January for some countries and in 
February for the majority of the countries, can provide important information about the 
current year GDP growth. But what we find is that by October of the previous year, 
forecasters begin the make major revisions to next year forecasts, and this is done in part 
by forming firm ideas about current year’s GDP growth. Therefore for most of the 
countries the improvement in the forecasts cannot be attributed to the release of the first 
quarter GDP. In fact, the first quarter GDP figures for the target year are not released 
during the first quarter of the current year. The U.S. and U.K. GDP figures for the first 
quarter are released during the last week of April and in most other countries GDP 
figures are released in the second half of May. Thus, it is clear that forecasters extract 
information from relevant monthly indicators such as employment, industrial production, 
manufacturing index, etc. that are correlated with GDP. In addition, various leading 
indicators (e.g., stock market index, interest rate spreads, building permits, 
unemployment insurance claims, etc.) which have predictive power up to a year and 
which are available more promptly act as valuable information sources. 
But we should note that there is a difference in the nature of information provided 
by monthly indicators during September of the previous year and February of the current 
year, and the GDP data releases for the previous year. The previous year's GDP figures 
increase the information content of the forecasts for several reasons. First, information of 
  23the previous year's GDP level determines the base of the GDP growth forecast for the 
following year, which may have substantial effect on the current year forecasts. In 
addition, if GDP growth has a large serial correlation and forecasters employ 
extrapolative expectations to capture this, the release of last year's GDP figure may 
initiate large revisions and increase the forecasting performance. It is also possible that 
the previous year’s GDP growth will have a large impact on the forecasting performance 
if the forecasters can learn from their previous mistakes and employ an error correction 
model to revise their expectations. 
6.4.  Content of new information implied in the actual process 
  In this section we provide a measure of new information in an “optimal” forecast, 
which is based on modeling the actual process. The content of the new information in the 
actual process can be calculated by estimating equation (1) using the actual quarterly real 
GDP growth data. For example, one may think of fitting an MA model on the real GDP 
growth series, and then treating the estimated MA coefficients as estimates for  h θ  
coefficients. As pointed before, this approach is the main idea behind several studies in 
the calculations of the information content of optimal forecasts, e.g., Öller (1985). 
  But, in this study the forecasts are what are called “fixed-target” forecasts. So the 
target variable represented by yt is not quarterly real GDP growth but annual real GDP 
growth. This implies that we have to make a transformation on the MA coefficients 
estimated using the quarterly real GDP growth series to be comparable with the annual 
real GDP growth forecasts. 
 Suppose  yt denotes the annual real GDP growth as before and   denotes the 
annualized quarterly real GDP growth q quarters before the end of the year t. For 
, tq y %
  24example,   is the GDP growth rate in the last quarter of year t and   is the GDP 
growth rate in the first quarter of the year t. Note that in this notation we have 
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Then substituting this MA process in the equation (12) gives the MA representation for 
the actual process: 
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More specifically, the MA form can be represented as follows: 
1 t k
i
         ( 1 4 )  
where 
γ .           ( 1 5 )  
  The intuition behind this representation should be straightforward. While last 
quarter shocks have only a unique chance of having an impact on the annual GDP 
growth, third quarter shocks will have the chance two times: contemporaneous effect on 
the third quarter GDP (via  0 γ ) and then a secondary effect on the last quarter GDP 
  25growth (via  1 γ ). Similarly, first quarter shocks will have four impact coefficients. When 
the horizon is larger than 4 quarters, the shocks will have 4 chances to have an effect on 
the current year GDP growth. But in this case, there will not be any contemporaneous 
impact since the effect will be seen on the previous year's GDP growth. 
                                                
  To estimate the  k γ s, we use the seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP growth 
and estimate ARMA models for each country. The AIC criterion was used to select the 
order of AR and MA terms. Then we transformed this ARMA models into a MA( ) ∞  
representation, which gives us  k γ s. This is a 'safe' way to get a reasonable MA 
representation. Direct MA modeling is an alternative way but the models may not 
converge under certain conditions. After getting the MA coefficients of the quarterly 
model, we construct the MA coefficients of the annual model using equation (15) and 








× ∑ . 
  To be comparable with the survey forecast data we use the 1990-2001 period to 
estimate ARMA models for each country. Note that the longest horizon we are interested 
is two years and we use quarterly GDP growth rates to estimate the  k γ s, so we have only 
eight observations to plot for each country.
15 For the sake of brevity and in order to see a 
stable “flow of information” curve, Figure 6 presents the percentage shares of 18 
countries aggregated and separately only for the UK and the US by horizon. Since we use 
quarterly data to generate the shares, we plot each quarter's value in the center of the 
 
15 There were outliers in the data too: Germany on 1991:1 (8.32%), Portugal on 1988:1 (15.6%), and 
Norway on 1997:2 (6.9%). In addition, the GDP growth rates of Spain behave abnormally during 2000:2 to 
2001:1 having growth rates of 3.8, -3.04, 5.3 and -2.2 percent respectively. With these data points, the 
model failed to converge so we used the data until 2000:1 for Spain. Except for the Spanish case, the results 
were, however, not affected by the control of the outliers. 
  26quarter. So, for example, the first estimated share of a contemporaneous shock is plotted 
when the horizon is 2 months. Despite small samples, the results clearly suggest an 
asymmetric hump-shaped adjustment with a peak at 11 months horizon. With a few 
exceptions, a similar pattern was found for each of the sample countries.
16 
We do not expect these graphs based on optimal forecasts from the actual data 
generating process to be exactly the same as those based on survey forecasts. First, 
because the flow of information curve with optimal forecasts was estimated using 
quarterly data, the curve will be slightly shifted to the right. Moreover, as we have 
pointed out before, forecast errors in real life are driven not only by the level of “well 
behaved” noise attributed to the data generating process based on revised data, but also 
by numerous other factors. For example, randomness and systematic features in data 
revisions, structural breaks, model misspecifications, outliers, etc. that are only detectable 
ex post, are some of the factors that may affect the information content of real-time 
forecasts. These factors do not affect the ex post analysis of historical data of the target 
variable, but may induce significant noise in the information content of real-time survey 
forecasts. The observed peak with survey expectations arrives a little earlier (Fig. 5) than 
the peak using optimal forecasts from a fitted time series model (Fig. 6) possibly because 
survey forecasts freely absorb information from other indicators in forecasting GDP 
growth that the time series model cannot. This is an important intuition about the value of 
survey forecasts that we glean by comparing survey forecasts with those from time series 
models.  
                                                 
16 These countries are: Austria, Denmark, Japan, Norway, and Portugal. The anomaly for these countries 
can possibly be explained by the estimated AR coefficients due to small samples and their robustness.  
  277. Conclusions 
  In this paper we study the characteristics of monthly GDP growth forecasts for 18 
developed countries during 1989-2004. We study how forecasting performance improves 
as the forecast horizon decreases, and at what horizons forecasts start to become 
informative. Since there are many forecasting organizations around the world providing 
forecasts for many macroeconomic variables with horizons up to two years or more, it is 
useful to explore the value of these forecasts, and thereby understand the limits to how far 
ahead today’s professionals can reasonably forecast. Since the panel of forecasters in 
Consensus Economics, Inc. are all private market agents, the limits to forecasting that 
these specialists exhibit can safely be taken as indicative of the current state of economic 
foresight.  However, the answer from our exhaustive data analysis did not turn out to be a 
“single-liner”. We have found wide diversity in the quality of the forecasts across 
countries, and the horizons at which forecasts start becoming useful, possibly reflecting 
the forecast difficulty of the underlying series. 
We used Theil’s U statistic with the 5-year rolling GDP growth as the benchmark, 
and another measure of predictability recently suggested by Diebold and Kilian (2001) 
with the 24-month ahead forecast as the benchmark. For 24-month ahead forecasts, U is 
less than one for all countries except for Italy and Switzerland, but very marginally. For 
12-month ahead forecasts, all the countries have U statistics less than one, implying that 
the forecasts have predictive value. Using the Diebold-Kilian skill measure and the 
variance functions, we however found that for majority of the countries the longer-term 
forecasts for up to 18 months are no better than the initial 24-month ahead forecasts. That 
is, over these longer horizons, forecasters do not receive dependable information to adjust 
  28their forecasts. We also observed a similar pattern when we looked at the horizons at 
which the survey forecasts beat the naïve no-change forecast. These findings imply that 
the survey forecasts do not have much value when the horizon goes beyond 18 months.  
In this paper we have proposed two alternative approaches to measure the flow 
content of new information in survey forecasts. The first measure is based on the 
improvement in actual forecasting performance over horizons, and the second measure is 
based on forecast revisions that can be considered as a measure of the importance of new 
information as perceived by forecasters. Whereas the latter can be interpreted as a 
measure of how forecasters interpret the importance of news in real time, the former is 
the ex post “prize” they get as a result of revising their forecasts. Under rationality and 
without much unforeseen errors in the sample period, these two approaches should yield 
similar results. Using nonparametric methods, we found that both the approaches indicate 
the largest improvement in forecasting performance comes when the forecast horizon is 
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  32Table 1 
MAE, RMSE, and Theil’s U  
 
  12-month ahead forecasts    24-month ahead forecasts 
Country MAE  RMSE  Theil’s  U MAE  RMSE  Theil’s  U 
Austria  0.98 1.16 0.69 1.24 1.48 0.94 
Belgium  0.99 1.15 0.62 1.28 1.68 0.89 
Canada  1.21 1.36 0.58 1.44  1.7  0.77 
Denmark  0.72 0.99 0.65 0.96 1.14 0.73 
Finland  2.24 2.89 0.59  2.7  3.37 0.68 
France  0.79 0.99 0.58 1.15  1.5  0.84 
Germany  0.79 1.03 0.37 1.49 1.96 0.67 
Ireland  2.35 2.76 0.75 2.98 3.67 0.96 
Italy  0.77 0.87 0.62 1.39 1.61 1.12 
Japan  1.41 1.58 0.64  1.9  2.3  0.91 
Netherlands  0.89 1.06 0.45 1.38 1.72 0.71 
Norway  0.92 1.13 0.58 1.14 1.33 0.68 
Portugal  0.98 1.31 0.43  1.4  1.89 0.60 
Spain  0.61 0.86 0.40 1.18 1.58 0.70 
Sweden  0.9  1.13 0.47 1.46 1.84 0.76 
Switzerland  1.22 1.45 0.75 1.71 2.04 1.02 
UK  0.77 1.02 0.43 1.08 1.62 0.71 
USA  0.96 1.09 0.57 1.28 1.59 0.92 
U statistic uses 5 year rolling average GDP growth as the naïve forecast. 
 
 
  33Fig. 1. Evolution of fixed-target forecasts over horizons  
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  38Fig. 3. Information content of forecasts over horizons (U statistic uses 5 year rolling 
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  40Fig. 4. Flow of information arrival over horizons, 1989:10 – 2004:06 
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